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In [1], Kent correctly points out that in consistent his-
tories quantum theory it is possible, given initial and
final states, to construct two different consistent families
of histories (what Kent calls consistent sets), in each of
which there is a proposition that can be inferred with
probability one, and such that the projectors represent-
ing these two propositions are mutually orthogonal. In
response we stress that, according to the rules of consis-
tent history reasoning two such propositions are not con-
trary in the usual logical sense [2]: namely, that one can
infer that if one is true then the other is false, and both
could be false. No single consistent family contains both
propositions, together with the initial and final states,
and hence the propositions cannot be logically compared.
Let us say projectors P and Q are “perpendicular”, to
employ a term with no logical connotation, if PQ = 0
and P 6= I −Q. If two “perpendicular” projectors occur
in the same consistent family, they represent mutually
exclusive events such that if the probability of one is 1
(true), that of the other is 0 (false), and thus the events
corresponding to these projectors are “contrary” in the
logical sense. However, the requirement stated in italics
is absolutely essential, for it is a basic rule of reasoning in
the consistent history formalism that all inferences must
be carried out in a single consistent family [3,4].
As an example [5], suppose a particle can be in one of
three non-overlapping boxes, for which the correspond-
ing orthogonal states are |A〉, |B〉, |C〉, and assume the
dynamics is trivial: if the particle starts in one box, it
stays there. Let
|Φ〉 = (|A〉 + |B〉+ |C〉)/√3,
|Ψ〉 = (|A〉+ |B〉 − |C〉)/√3, (1)
be initial and final states at times t0 and t2. There is
a consistent family of histories A including these initial
and final states, and, at a time t1 between t0 and t2, the
projectors A = |A〉〈A| and A˜ = I −A, which correspond
to the particle being or not being in boxA. Application of
the consistent history formalism yields Pr(A|Φ,Ψ) = 1;
that is, using family A, it is certain that the particle
at time t1 is in box A. There is also a second consistent
family B in which B = |B〉〈B| and B˜ = I−B are possible
intermediate states at time t1, and using this family one
finds Pr(B|Φ,Ψ) = 1.
The projectors A and B are “perpendicular” in the
sense defined above. However, there is no consistent fam-
ily which includes Φ at t0 and Ψ at t2 together with both
A and B at t1. Thus inferences that concern both A and
B, such as that the events are contrary, cannot be drawn
from the initial and final data. (For additional remarks,
see App. A of [6].) Kent employs the term “contrary” for
the relationship between projectors that we have been
calling “perpendicular”, whether or not they occur in
the same consistent family. But importing a term from
classical logic into quantum theory must be done with
some care in order to avoid confusion, as illustrated by
the example just discussed.
By contrast, if a projector P occurs in a consistent fam-
ily, I−P necessarily occurs in the same family, according
to the rules in [4]. Hence, one can say that P and I−P are
“contradictory” in the sense of classical logic [2]. There
are no initial and final states for which projectors P and
I−P can have probability one in different consistent fam-
ilies, because the probability assigned to any event on the
basis of given data is independent of the consistent family
in which it occurs. Kent [1] expresses concern that the
consistent history formalism thereby treats contradictory
and perpendicular projectors in different ways. However,
we see no necessary reason for symmetry, because, while
a pair P and I − P can always be associated with the
logical notion of “contradictory”, perpendicular projec-
tors need not be associated with the logical concept of
“contrary”, as in the examples Kent is concerned with.
Alternative, more restrictive, formulations of consistent
histories quantum mechanics, as in [7], should be judged
as theories on their own merits and ultimately by com-
parison with experiment.
Consistent histories quantum theory is logically con-
sistent, consistent with experiment, consistent with the
usual quantum predictions for measurements, and appli-
cable to the most general physical systems. It may not be
the only theory with these properties, but in our opinion,
it is the most promising among present possibilities.
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